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The psychology of the unconscious is the philosophy of revolution: i.e., this is what it 
is destined to become because it ferments insurrection within the psyche, and liberates 
individuality from the bonds of its own unconscious. It is destined to make us 
inwardly capable of freedom, destined to prepare the ground for the revolution.1  
 
Thus I have not the courage to rise up before my fellow-men as a prophet, and I bow 
to their reproach that I can offer them no consolation: for at bottom that is what they 
are all demanding—the wildest revolutionaries no less passionately than the most 
virtuous believers.2  
 
Introduction 
As the above two quotes suggest, anarchism and psychoanalysis have an ambiguous and 
somewhat paradoxical relationship. Otto Gross, the psychoanalyst and follower of Freud, 
declared himself an anarchist and celebrated the revolutionary potential of the unconscious, 
opening the way to a politically radical articulation of psychoanalytic theory that was taken 
up by thinkers such as Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse. On the other hand, Freud 
himself, and later on, Jacques Lacan, while not unsympathetic to ideas of emancipation and 
social progress, at the same time expressed a cautious skepticism about revolutionary politics, 
pointing to what they saw as its naïve utopianism. While one could say that both anarchism 
1 Otto Gross, “Overcoming Cultural Crisis,” Die Aktion (April 1913), reprinted in Anarchism: a Documentary 
History of Libertarian Ideas. Vol. 1, From Anarchy to Anarchism (300CE to 1939), ed. R. Graham (Montreal: 
Black Rose, 2005), 281-286: 281. 
2 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents [1929], trans. and ed. J. Strachey (New York: W. Norton & 
Co., 1961), 92. 
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and psychoanalysis have as their ethical goal the greater autonomy of the individual, 
anarchists have criticized psychoanalysis—at least in its more traditional forms—as being 
individualizing and ultimately conservative, seeking to adjust the psyche to the pressures and 
constraints of a repressive society.  
 There is therefore something both impossible and inevitable about the relationship 
between psychoanalysis and anarchism. Without an understanding of the psyche, its irrational 
desires and its passionate attachments to authority figures, there can be no coherent theory of 
political action, let alone a successful revolution. At the same time, psychoanalytic theory 
poses fundamental questions to the very concept of revolution, highlighting the utopian 
fantasies and “wish fulfillment” embodied in such notions, and revealing the deeper problem 
of the inextricable link between revolutionary desire and the position of the Master. Yet, as 
suggested by the more radical exponents of the psychoanalytic tradition, there is indeed 
something potentially transformative and liberating—both individually and socio-
politically—about psychoanalysis. And, if we can speak of a psychoanalytic anarchism, we 
can perhaps also speak of an anarchistic psychoanalysis. Yet, as I will show, this would 
involve a different way of thinking about anarchism, in which the desire for greater autonomy 
is coupled with an awareness of the pitfalls and dangers awaiting revolutionary projects.  
 In exploring this unavoidable encounter between anarchism and psychoanalysis, this 
chapter will mainly confine itself to a discussion of the (post)Freudian tradition, including 
Reich, Marcuse, and Lacan, as different as they are. While there are no doubt many non-
Freudian forms of psychotherapy which might, superficially at least, have more in common 
with anarchist practices,3 my contention is that it is the Freudian tradition, with its seemingly 
hierarchical architecture and discourse, that confronts anarchism with fundamental questions 
about our own relationship with power and authority. So, rather than this being a 
3 I have in mind here various forms of radical group and play psychotherapy, which grew out of the anti-
psychiatry movement, in particular Somatherapy, which has a distinctly anarchist orientation. Even this, 
however, was based on the Freudian-inspired theories of Wilhelm Reich. 
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comprehensive survey of psychotherapeutic practices and their similarities with anarchism, 
this chapter will focus on specific areas of theoretical controversy in order to test anarchism 
at its limits.  
 
Voluntary Servitude and the Problem of Human Autonomy 
Psychoanalysis and anarchism both have as their central concern the conflicting relationship 
between the individual and society. For Freud, the story of the individual’s entry into society 
is also the story of his repression—first through the Oedipal dynamics of the family, and then 
at the hands of external institutions and laws. Thus, the individual chafes against the bars of 
civilization, a civilization which promised him comfort but brought him only unhappiness 
and guilt. Freud was keenly aware of the suffering this tension caused, and saw 
psychoanalytic treatment as a way of relieving unhappiness. Moreover, while some limits 
upon the individual’s behavior were necessary and inevitable, Freud believed there was 
sufficient scope to relax the undue pressures and constraints imposed by society. While a 
society entirely without guilt and repression was impossible, there was at least the 
possibility—indeed, this was the ethical and even perhaps the “political” goal of 
psychoanalysis—of a society and culture that was less repressive and less guilt-inducing. 
 So, Freudian psychoanalysis rails against the unjustified and excessive demands of the 
super-ego and the social order, with their irrational moral strictures and prohibitions: 
In our research into, and therapy of, a neurosis, we are led to make two reproaches 
against the super-ego of the individual. In the severity of its commands and 
prohibitions it troubles itself too little about the happiness of the ego, in that it takes 
insufficient account of the resistances against obeying them—of the instinctual 
strength of the id [in the first place], and of the difficulties presented by the real 
external environment [in the second]. Consequently we are very often obliged, for 
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therapeutic purposes, to oppose the super-ego, and we endeavor to lower its demands. 
Exactly the same objections can be made against the ethical demands of the cultural 
super-ego. It, too, does not trouble itself enough about the facts of the mental 
constitution of human beings. It issues a command and does not ask whether it is 
possible for people to obey it. On the contrary, it assumes that a man's ego is 
psychologically capable of anything that is required of it, that his ego has unlimited 
mastery over his id. This is a mistake; and even in what are known as normal people 
the id cannot be controlled beyond certain limits. If more is demanded of a man, a 
revolt will be produced in him or a neurosis, or he will be made unhappy.4  
Is there not a clear, strident anti-authoritarianism in Freud’s words here; a cry of protest 
against the excessive constrictions under which the individual is placed? Is there not 
expressed here a desire for greater individual freedom and autonomy, as well as a recognition 
of the rebellion that lies latent within us - a rebellion which would be fully understandable, 
even justified, given the severity of social restrictions? The id, for Freud, is the original 
anarchist—the wild unconscious with its socially unacceptable drives and desires that are 
only partially contained by the ego and which threaten to explode the very institutional 
framework of civilization. Indeed, the central fiction of psychoanalysis—the story of 
Oedipus—is one of rebellion and transgression: the Oedipal subject rebels against the law of 
the Father, the symbolization of patriarchal authority which blocks and prohibits the child’s 
desire. And it is through this process of rebellion that the child becomes, albeit with varying 
degrees of success, an autonomous individual.  
 We have to see psychoanalysis, then, as a critical interrogation of the limits and 
prohibitions of our society. As Herbert Marcuse said, Freudian psychoanalysis, before its 
4 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 89-90. 
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revisionist permutations, was a “radically critical theory.”5 Certainly in Freud’s time his ideas 
were perceived as a radical assault on the moral foundations of bourgeois society; his theory 
of the unconscious, with its illicit and inadmissible impulses and wishes, and his discovery of 
childhood sexuality, were just as damaging to the Victorian moral universe and its own self-
image as Darwin’s theory of evolution. Indeed, in many ways Freud is just as disturbing to 
our sensibilities today as he was in his own time.  
 Surely, then, psychoanalysis finds some preliminary common ground with anarchism, 
that most heretical and revolutionary of political doctrines, in which the freedom of the 
individual from repressive social constraints is paramount. Central to both discourses is the 
story of human rebellion and freedom. Furthermore, anarchism, perhaps more than other 
revolutionary philosophies, is concerned with what might be called the psychosocial 
domain—the domain of inter-subjective relationships, in which one’s everyday relations with 
others are of real ethical and political concern.6 Hence the importance to anarchism of 
“prefiguration”—achieving the revolution first in terms of one’s everyday relations with 
others, as a condition for the achievement of the revolution at the broader societal level; and 
the rejection of strategic means-ends thinking. A central problem for anarchists is the desire 
for authority which, as Bakunin recognized, lurked within our breasts, and which would, 
given the temptations of power, lead to authoritarian behavior if the apparatus of command— 
the state—were not demolished as the first revolutionary act:  
Man’s nature is so constituted that, given the possibility of doing evil, that is, of 
feeding his vanity, his ambition, and his cupidity at the expense of someone else, he 
surely will make full use of such an opportunity. We are all of course sincere 
5 H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud [1955]  (London: Routledge, 1998), 
238. 
6 The anarchist Gustav Landauer saw the state primarily as a relationship, one that could only be destroyed by 
‘contracting’ other kinds of relationships and by behaving differently. See G. Landauer, “Schwache 
Staatsmänner, Schwächeres Volk!”, Der Sozialist (June 15,1910), reprinted and translated as “Weak State, 
Weaker People,” in Revolution and Other Writings: A Political Reader, ed. and trans. G. Kuhn (Oakland, CA: 
PM Press, 2010), 213-214. 
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Socialists and revolutionists; and still, were we to be endowed with power, even for a 
short duration of a few months, we would not be where we are now.7  
Here we have Bakunin sounding very much like Freud, expressing a fundamental distrust of 
human nature and its desire for power and authority, which must be tempered by creating 
alternative social arrangements, or, rather, by removing the structures which allow such 
desires to be realized. My point is that anarchism, as a revolutionary philosophy, was keenly 
aware of the subject’s latent authoritarian tendencies and desires—which, if not checked, 
would only condemn the revolution to reinstituting authoritarian political and social 
structures—and therefore of the importance of encouraging alternative, non-authoritarian 
relationships on a micro-political level.  
 Therefore, both anarchism and psychoanalysis are concerned with the way that power 
not only coerces externally, but also becomes internalized within the psyche, producing 
authoritarian and patriarchal attitudes as well as a desire for one’s own repression and 
domination. Perhaps the central problem that both psychoanalysis and anarchism confront, or 
ought to confront, is that of voluntary servitude: the strange desire, observed long ago by La 
Boétie, which led people to voluntarily obey even tyrannical forms of power when it was 
clearly against their own interests to do so.8 For La Boétie, power did not need to be coercive 
or violent: induced by a wayward, misdirected desire, people relinquished their own freedom 
and became willing slaves of the tyrant. Surely, the phenomenon of voluntary obedience to 
authority is the central problem for radical politics, a problem no less apparent today—
perhaps even more so—than in La Boétie’s time. Anarchists have long been aware of this 
problem. Kropotkin attributed the emergence of the modern state in part to people becoming 
7 Mikhail Bakunin, The Political Philosophy of Bakunin: Scientific Anarchism, ed. G.P Maximoff (Glencoe, IL: 
The Free Press, 1953), 249. 
8 Étienne La Boétie, The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, [1576], trans. H. Kurz 
(Auburn, AL: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008). 
 
6 
 
                                                          
“enamoured of authority.”9 Stirner spoke of the way that we carry “the gendarme” in our 
breast pocket.10  
 Freud also endeavored to explain our passionate attachments to figures of authority. 
In his study of the psychodynamics of groups, Freud considers the question posed by the 
social psychologist, Gustave Le Bon, of why people, particularly in crowds, display a “thirst 
for obedience.” As Freud says, paraphrasing Le Bon, “A group is an obedient herd, which 
could never live without a master. It has such a thirst for obedience that it submits 
instinctively to anyone who appoints himself its master.”11 For Freud, as with La Boétie, 
voluntary obedience to another’s will is an enigma requiring explanation, as well as 
constituting a genuine ethical problem. Freud claims to be disturbed by the power of 
suggestion, such as that which the hypnotist exercises over the hypnotized—something which 
he equates with a kind of violence—and he seeks to understand how this works, not only in 
individual situations, but, more importantly, in group settings where the individual instinct 
for self-preservation seems more readily abandoned and rendered up to the leader of the 
group, who is a kind of grand hypnotist. Freud observed an emotional contagion at work in 
group situations which emanates from the libido; individuals, who otherwise have little in 
common, are bound together within a group through the love instinct. For Freud, what makes 
this libidinal bond possible is the figure of the leader, who acts as a cipher of love and 
identification.12 The relation of the group member to his or her leader is thus a one of love 
and idealization—the leader becomes something like a love object which comes to supplant 
9 Peter Kropotkin, The State: Its Historic Role [1896] (London: Freedom Press, 1943), 28. 
10 Max Stirner, The Ego and its Own [1844], ed. D. Leopold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
50. 
11 Sigmund Freud, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” [1921], in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans., J. Strachey, Vol. 18: 1920-1922 (London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1955), 67-143: 81. 
12 Ibid., 95. 
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the individual’s own ego ideal, which is why the follower often loses any sense of self-
preservation and autonomy, and is even prepared to sacrifice himself for this object.13  
 To deepen this analysis of the phenomenon of voluntary obedience, Freud returns to 
the myth of the Primal Father, first explored in Totem and Taboo.14According to this social 
myth, the primal father—the ultimate and original patriarch—has absolute power over his 
sons and demands from them devotion and obedience. The sons fear the primal father 
equally, thus creating a bond and sense of equality and community between them. However, 
as the father—the archetypal absolute sovereign—enjoys unrestricted access to all the women 
of tribe, prohibiting it to the sons, the sons band together to kill and devour the father. Yet, so 
the myth goes, this ultimate transgression creates a sense of collective guilt amongst the sons, 
and thus the law against incest arises. I will return to this later, as it has important 
consequences for this discussion: the removal of one form of prohibition does not necessarily 
free us as internalized constraints come to the fore to take its place.  
 Nevertheless, Freud’s point here is to illustrate the ways in which we become attached 
to figures of social and political authority through a complex relation of desire and 
identification. As he says: “The leader of the group is still the dreaded primal father; the 
group still wishes to be governed by unrestricted force; it has an extreme passion for 
authority…”15 Our blind, voluntary submission to figures of authority is as much an ethical 
(indeed one could also say political) problem for psychoanalysis as it is for anarchism. 
Indeed, if there is an ethics of psychoanalysis it is, to use the words of Mikkel Borch-
Jacobsen, “a libertarian protest against the hypnotist’s power and an authoritarian theory of 
the social bond.”16 A deeper understanding of the human psyche, and the way it becomes 
13 Ibid., 113. 
14 Sigmund Freud, “Totem and Taboo” [1913], in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, trans., James Strachey, Vol. 13: 1913-1914 (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), 1-164. 
15 Ibid., 127. 
16 M. Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject, trans. C. Porter (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 
156. 
8 
 
                                                          
libidinally integrated into systems of power and authority such that the subject obeys without 
even thinking about it, is surely crucial for any radical political theory. Psychoanalysis is in 
this sense indispensable to anarchism. This is perhaps more so the case today, where, for the 
most part, capitalist societies control their populations not through outright coercion— 
although there is this too—but what might be considered as generalized psychological 
manipulation.  
 This is not so much a question of ideology or what the Marxists used to call “false 
consciousness”—although here I take Slavoj Žižek’s point about the way that ideology 
permeates external social practices, as well operating through our cynical distance from it.17 
Indeed, this alone raises extremely important questions about voluntary servitude and the way 
it operates—through habits of obedience, work, and consumption—in contemporary 
neoliberal societies, in which La Boétie’s figure of the Tyrant or Freud’s figure of the 
Father/Master is, for the most part, absent. Perhaps the sadness of our times lies in the fact 
that there is no longer any Father/Master who might serve as a cover or excuse for our 
voluntary obedience, and yet we obey like never before,  perhaps more so than if there were a 
clear figure of authority to rebel against.   
 However, by psychological manipulation I am also referring to the whole panoply of 
techniques which aim to control and normalize people at the level of their psyche: everything 
from the widespread use of anti-depressants and drugs to control behavior such as ADHD, to 
the prevalence of CBT as a form of therapy, to the largely unquestioned power of the 
pharmaceutical industry and the psychiatric establishment in the “treatment” of mental 
disorders.18 We can add to this a much more pervasive form of psychological control, which 
consists in the over-stimulation of the psyche—and through this the shaping of behavior— 
enabled by ubiquitous and overlapping electronic circuits and communications technologies. 
17 See S. Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989). 
18 The “anti-psychiatry” movement, prominent in the 1960s and 70s, seems much less so today. 
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 We are utterly immersed today in the hyper-real universe of electronic media and 
instantaneous communication, and while this no doubt equips us with potentially important 
tools of political mobilization, more often than not, it has an utterly disabling and alienating 
effect. For instance, we suffer not from a lack of information, but rather from an excess of it, 
more than the human organism can possibly cope with, and this is what makes us feel 
impotent, as well conditioning and programming our behavior such that we are increasingly 
reduced to a bundle of reactions and reflexes, unable to concentrate on anything for more 
than a few seconds. Franco “Bifo” Berardi has explored the condition of the human soul 
under contemporary semiocapitalism: the psychopathological states generated by constant 
over-stimulation from media images, advertising, information, semioflows, all of which result 
in a generalized loss of meaning and states of psychic despair.19 The epidemic rise of 
depression and anxiety in contemporary capitalist societies is no doubt symptomatic of this.  
 Such forms of psychological manipulation and normalization seriously place in 
jeopardy the very idea of individual autonomy. The kinds of nervous stimulation and neural 
marketing that we are subject to today are reminiscent of the crudest of behaviorist 
experiments popular in the 1950s and 60s. Even the forms of treatment on offer today for 
psychological maladies—medication and cognitive behavioral therapy, driven as they are by 
the neoliberal logic of economic efficiency and the “quick-fix”—amount to nothing less than 
a bastardization of the human condition. While in certain cases psychoanalysis has been 
complicit in these processes of normalization (indeed, this was Lacan’s charge against the 
“ego-psychologists” who misapplied Freudian theory in the US), and while Freud’s notorious 
nephew Edward Bernays recruited crude, popularized versions of psychoanalytic theory into 
the marketing of everything from cigarettes and motor cars to the American war effort, 
psychoanalysis on the whole refuses the superficial and degrading conception of the human 
19 See F. Berardi, The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy, trans. F. Cadel and G. Mecchia (Cambridge, 
MA.: MIT Press, 2009). 
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subject on offer today. Central to the ethics of psychoanalysis, I would argue, is actually a 
resistance to normalization and a respect for the dignity and absolute singularity of the human 
subject—and this is where, once again, psychoanalysis finds important common ground with 
anarchism. 
 Yet, what of the claim often made, including by anarchists, that psychoanalysis is 
politically irrelevant, even conservative, because it is individualizing? The contention here is 
that because psychoanalysis is focused on individual therapy, it simply cannot offer any 
radical analysis, let alone any possibility of transforming, the broader social field—something 
which would require collective consciousness and action. I hope to have shown already that 
psychoanalysis does indeed provide us with the means to critically analyze the broader social 
field, particularly with regards to the subject’s relationship to external authority, as well as his 
behavior in groups and social collectivities. Freud insisted that psychoanalysis, insofar as it 
explores the individual’s relations with others starting from the earliest stages of life, is 
always an individual and a social psychology.20  
 However, a second criticism of psychoanalysis perhaps bears more weight: this is the 
claim, made by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their famous work, Anti-Oedipus,21 that 
psychoanalysis is “representational”—that is, that psychoanalysis, particularly the Freudian 
kind, seeks to represent or “speak for” the subject’s desire by interpreting it within the 
reductionist “theater” of Oedipus, thus doing a real violence to desire. Furthermore, in 
trapping desire within the discursive framework of Oedipus, psychoanalysis has the effect of 
closing desire off from social connections, thereby limiting its revolutionary potential. There 
is of course a parallel here with the anarchist critique of representative political structures and 
parties which seek to “speak for” and lead the people, interpreting their own political desires 
20 Freud, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” 2.  
21 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia [1972], trans. R. Hurley, et al. 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). 
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back to them in a distorted form and thus alienating and disempowering them. The subject’s 
desire, for Deleuze and Guattari and for the anarchists, should be allowed to “speak for 
itself”; to try to speak for someone else establishes a position of epistemic and therefore 
political authority over that person.  
 According to Deleuze and Guattari, the real problem with psychoanalysis is the way 
that it founds desire on lack—the lack of the lost object of desire, the lack of the Mother and 
so on—whereas desire is actually about plenitude and productivity, and always moves in the 
direction of rhizomatic connections with others, in the manner of “desiring machines.” By 
reducing desire to lack, psychoanalysis, it is claimed, does not repress desire so much as 
represents it as repressed, and this is precisely what traps desire within normalized social 
codes and structures:  
Oedipal desires are the bait, the disfigured image by means of which repression 
catches desire in the trap. If desire is repressed, this is not because it is desire for the 
mother and for the death of the father; on the contrary, desire becomes that only 
because it is repressed, it takes on that mask only under the reign of the repression 
that models the mask for it and plasters it on its face… If desire is repressed, it is 
because every position of desire, no matter how small, is capable of calling into 
question the established order of a society: not that desire is asocial, on the contrary. 
But it is explosive; there is no desiring-machine capable of being assembled without 
demolishing entire social sectors. Despite what some revolutionaries think about this, 
desire is revolutionary in its essence-desire, not left-wing holidays!-and no society can 
tolerate a position of real desire without its structures of exploitation, servitude, and 
hierarchy being compromised.22  
22 Ibid., 116. 
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While I am less convinced than these two May 68ers of the essentially revolutionary nature 
of desire, they nevertheless touch on a crucial theme that begins to mark an important point 
of difference between psychoanalysis and anarchism: while anarchism might be said to work 
on a model of liberation—desires are repressed by external prohibitions, and must therefore 
be liberated—psychoanalysis is more cautious here.  
 If human desire is actually constituted through a certain repression—that is through 
Oedipal prohibition, through the lack of the object of desire—then not only does desire need 
some sort of limit to sustain itself, but, if such external limits were removed, then internalized 
ones would simply emerge to take their place. In other words, from a psychoanalytic 
viewpoint, it is too simple to talk about the liberation of desire from external constraints; 
liberation does not solve the problem of repression— indeed, it may actually intensify it. That 
is to say, if there is a conceptual difference between anarchism and psychoanalysis, it lies in 
their different approaches to the relationship between desire and limit, freedom and 
constraint; for psychoanalysis, this relationship, as we shall see, is highly paradoxical, 
complicating the revolutionary narrative.  
 
Radical Psychoanalysis: Gross, Reich, and Marcuse 
Before addressing this difficulty, however, it is important to explore the politically radical 
tradition of psychoanalytic theory, and here I turn to three post-Freudian thinkers—Otto 
Gross, Wilhelm Reich, and Herbert Marcuse—all of whom developed revolutionary 
articulations of psychoanalysis which, in important ways, found common ground with 
anarchism. However, the point here is not to show that psychoanalysis fits perfectly with 
anarchism—as I have said it does not—but rather to argue, against claims to the contrary, that 
psychoanalytic theory has no application to questions of social and political transformation.  
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 Otto Gross, the ‘anarchist psychoanalyst’ as he came to be known,23 and forerunner of 
the sexual revolution and the countercultural movement, was an early disciple of Freud’s, 
although he later came to reject certain aspects of Freud’s theory. He saw in psychoanalysis 
the potential for a revolt against patriarchal authority and the means to emancipate the 
individual from his or her own internalized guilt and repression. The unconscious was 
essentially revolutionary and, by tapping into the unconscious, psychoanalysis could provide 
the individual with the tools of his or her own liberation. Psychoanalysis was therefore, for 
Gross, a revolutionary practice which could be used to overthrow the repressive social order 
and to promote greater individual and sexual freedom.  
 He proposed, moreover, that the existing social order, founded on patriarchal 
authority, should be replaced by a less repressive and more cooperative matriarchal order. 
Indeed, as Gottfried M. Heuer points out, Gross’s concern with cooperative and mutual 
relationships, which he saw as the innate orientation of the ego and whose promotion should 
be the ethical goal of the revolution, rather than what he called the “will to power,” paralleled 
and drew upon Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid, which he also regarded as instinctive.24 In 
the case of both theories, the interpersonal and intersubjective dimension is central and 
provides the impetus and means to achieve the social revolution.  
 At the same time, we find in Gross a certain sense of caution about the prospects of 
revolution. There is an acknowledgement that revolutions in the past have failed to achieve 
their aim of liberation, only reinventing the structures of authority and class hierarchy they 
sought to overthrow. For Gross, this was because of the internalized authoritarianism that we 
bear within us, which the revolutionary struggle often fails to dislodge: 
23 Gross told the psychiatrists who examined him in 1913: “I have only mixed with anarchists and declare 
myself to be an anarchist… I am a psychoanalyst and from my experience I have gained the insight that the 
existing order […] is a bad one […A]nd since I want everything changed, I am an anarchist.” [Cited in G. 
Heuer, “The Birth of Intersubjectivity: Otto Gross and the Development of Psychoanalytic Theory and Clinical 
Practice,” Sexual Revolutions: Psychoanalysis, History and the Father, ed. G. Heuer (London: Routledge, 
2011), 122-140: 122.] 
24 Ibid., 130-131. 
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None of the revolutions in the course of history succeeded in establishing freedom for 
the individual. They all fell flat, each the forerunner of a new bourgeoisie, they ended 
in a hurried desire to conform to general norms. They all failed because the 
revolutionary of yesterday carried within himself the authority… that puts any 
individuality in chains.25  
Psychoanalysis therefore had an important role to play in allowing the individual to recognize 
and free himself from this internalized authoritarianism, and this was a pre-condition for any 
successful revolution. In other words, for Gross, psychoanalysis was a means of extending 
the revolution all the way down into the psyche and engaging in a personal struggle against 
one’s own “will to power”—against the desire to dominate and the desire to be dominated, 
which, after all, are two sides of the same coin. 
 A similar theme is pursued by Wilhelm Reich, whose own interest in sexual liberation 
and revolutionary politics might be seen as directly descending from Gross’s radical 
interpretation of psychoanalysis, as well as from Freudian ideas about libido, repression, 
sexual neuroses, and the mind-body connection. For Reich, not only would internalized 
authoritarianism—if it is not properly addressed—condemn the outcome of revolutions, but, 
worse still, would produce utterly reactionary and monstrous forms of politics. In his study 
The Mass Psychology of Fascism, written in 1933, Reich set out to conduct a psychoanalytic 
or what he called “sex-economic” investigation of the appeal of Nazism to ordinary Germans. 
The explanation was to be sought not within the Marxist theory of ‘false consciousness’ but, 
rather, in the real desire on the part of the masses for their own domination, a desire that 
originates, he argued, in sexual repression. Crucially, then, the success of the Nazis was 
attributable not to Hitler and his supposed charisma, but rather to the masses themselves, who 
in a sense created him: 
25 Cited in ibid., 132. 
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But the success of this mass organization [the NSDAP] is to be ascribed to the masses 
not to Hitler. It was man’s authoritarian freedom-fearing structure that enabled his 
propaganda to take root. Hence, what is important about Hitler sociologically does not 
issue from his personality but from the importance attached to him by the masses.26  
This desire for the Fascist Master arises from, as Reich puts it, an ‘authoritarian freedom-
fearing’ structure on the part of the masses and, in particular, from the conservative attitudes 
and values of the lower-middle classes, which stemmed ultimately from sexual repression. 
These included conservative attitudes towards sexuality, a reverence for authority, an 
ideology of “honor” and “duty,” and traditional patriarchal beliefs. Patriarchal authority 
within the family translated into the desire for an authoritarian state; the father was seen as a 
mini-Fuhrer, and this allowed people to identify with, and at the same time obey—according 
to the dynamic set out earlier by Freud in his study of the psychology of groups—the Fuhrer: 
“Notwithstanding his vassalage, every National Socialist felt himself to be a ‘little Hitler.’”27 
There is, as he put it, an ‘authority craving’ psychic structure within the people which the 
Nazis exploited and which made their tyranny possible. 
 For Reich, there is a direct link between sexual repression and political repression; as 
he shows, the self-repression of one’s sexual desire—due to an internalization of conservative 
attitudes, moral prejudices, and mystical and obscurantist beliefs and the fears of sexuality 
they engender—leads to a desire to be repressed politically. Repressed sexual energy is 
channeled against one’s own freedom. Therefore it is only by relaxing this sexual repression, 
so that the individual can achieve healthy sexual gratification, that he or she has any hope of 
living more freely and autonomously. Thus, the struggle for greater sexual freedom is directly 
linked to the struggle for political freedom and against economic exploitation and hierarchy; 
this was how Reich understood the goals of “sex-economic” practice. 
26 Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism [1933], ed. M. Higgins and C.M. Raphael (New York: 
Farrar, 1970), 40. Emphasis in original. 
27 Ibid., 80. 
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 The importance and centrality of sex and sexual freedom to revolutionary politics, 
however, has often not been sufficiently recognized by revolutionary movements themselves. 
Reich takes issue with Marxist-Leninism for neglecting the question of sexual freedom, and 
indeed for continuing to repress it in the name of a new kind of moralism in the post-
revolutionary Soviet Union.28 Furthermore, Reich attributes the stagnation of the Bolshevik 
Revolution and its deterioration into Stalinist totalitarianism in part to the failure to come to 
terms with people’s repressive psychic structure: the Bolshevik revolution “was a politico-
ideological and not a genuine social revolution.”29 In other words, the Revolution failed to 
achieve a real transformation in the human structure. The problem here was the idea that a 
certain model of freedom and social organization could be imposed from above, in a 
hierarchical and authoritarian fashion, rather than being allowed to develop spontaneously.  
 There are important parallels, then, between Reich’s political thought and anarchism: 
the post-repressive society was in a sense already immanent in social relations, and should be 
allowed to develop spontaneously and organically. While the masses were currently 
incapable of freedom, they could be guided in this direction by a new kind of “democratic-
revolutionary” movement, whose task was not to lead the masses from above in the manner 
of a vanguard, but rather to empower them to achieve their own autonomy and emancipation. 
This would involve the ethical task of inculcating a sense of responsibility on the part of the 
masses for their own freedom.30 It is here that the notion of “work-democracy,” which would 
be the basis of the post-repressive society, becomes important. Work-democracy, which 
implies a collaborative, egalitarian and non-exploitative relationship to work, is based on the 
recognition that sexual energy and daily working activity are closely related, and that this 
activity should be free and self-regulated so that people can derive genuine libidinal 
satisfaction from their work. Once again, according to Reich, this is not an ideological or 
28 Ibid., 161-162. 
29 Ibid., 201. 
30 Ibid., 220. 
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political goal that can be imposed from the top. Rather, as he puts it: “Work democracy is the 
sum total of all naturally developed and developing life functions which organically govern 
rational human relationships.”31  
 We have the very anarchistic idea, then, that rather than a certain institutional model 
being imposed upon society in the name of freedom, natural social relationships and impulses 
should be allowed to develop organically from below:  
To establish new, artificial, political systems would be not only unnecessary; it would 
be catastrophic. What is necessary is that the determination of the social process be 
given over to the natural life functions. Nothing new has to be created; all that has to 
be done is to eliminate the obstacles which stand in the way of the natural social 
functions.32  
Just as the health of the psyche depends on a certain free development of the libido, so too 
does the health of society depend on the free development of natural forces and energies. 
 The aspiration for a non-repressive society is also central to thought of Herbert 
Marcuse, who combined Freudian and Marxist theory into a radical psychoanalytical critique 
of social domination. In his work, Eros and Civilization (1955) which is a radical re-reading 
of Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents, Marcuse argues, against what he sees as Freud’s 
pessimism, that our civilization, which is founded on repression, also contains the seeds of a 
non-repressive society. So, in accepting Freud’s premise that the social order thus far has 
been based on the inhibition of sexual instincts—their diversion from gratification towards 
work and production—Marcuse, at the same time, rejects the position that the sacrifice of 
happiness to the needs of civilization is necessary and inevitable. In other words, contrary to 
Freud, the idea of a non-repressive civilization in which human happiness is allowed to 
flourish, is not a utopian speculation but is actually immanent within the existing social order: 
31 Ibid., 264. 
32 Ibid., 267. 
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“the very achievements of repressive civilization seem to create the preconditions for the 
gradual abolition of repression.”33 Freud had argued that social cohesion and cultural 
progress requires that the “pleasure principle” gives way to the “reality principle,” with its 
demands of work, sacrifice, and delaying gratification. While Marcuse acknowledges the 
need for certain limits to be placed on the instincts—if repression were completely removed 
and absolutely free play given to the pleasure principle, then civilization could not be 
sustained—he argues that in the existing social order, the basic level of repression required 
for social cohesion has been overtaken by what he calls surplus repression, which operates in 
the interests of social domination and economic exploitation. Here, the “performance 
principle” holds sway, demanding the absolute sacrifice of happiness and gratification to the 
toil and drudgery of alienated labor; thus the pleasure principle is completely negated.34 
Existing society represses its members far in excess of what is necessary for its own survival, 
forcing them into a life of alienation and unhappiness for the benefit of a capitalist apparatus 
of domination and social hierarchy which they do not understand and have no control over. 
 However, for Marcuse, the performance principle which results in a surplus of 
production has solved the problem of scarcity, thereby creating the conditions for greater 
freedom and autonomy and a relaxation of surplus repression—paralleling the Marxian 
argument that capitalist society, in its production of surplus wealth, creates the conditions for 
its own overcoming. Furthermore, the repression of erotic instincts is never complete; there is 
always an excess that escapes repression, and which finds its expression in fantasy and 
imagination, which, according to Marcuse, provide the libidinal drive for projects of 
emancipation and the impetus for a non-repressive culture in which work is transformed into 
play, in a manner similar to Reich’s notion of “work democracy,” as well as evoking 
Fourier’s utopian vision of eroticized work: “if work were accompanied by a reactivation of 
33 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 5.  
34 Ibid., 4.  
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pregenital polymorphous eroticism, it would tend to become more gratifying in itself without 
losing its work content.”35 There is the idea here of a certain non-repressive “self-
sublimation” of sex instincts into other spheres of life, producing an eroticization of relations 
between people.36 Yet, this newfound freedom is neither a return to primitive barbarism nor a 
condition of unrestrained sexual license. On the contrary, as Marcuse envisions, it produces a 
new kind of non-repressive order and harmony: “liberated from the tyranny of repressive 
reason, the instincts tend towards free and lasting relations—they generate a new reality 
principle.”37 This is similar to the claim central to anarchism: that freedom generates 
spontaneous order. 
 At the same time, however, Marcuse introduces an important qualification here, 
recognizing the difficulty in realizing freedom in a society which currently mistakes 
unfreedom for freedom: he gives the example of the capitalist entertainment industry which is 
itself repressive, and yet which assumes the form of freedom, such that its repression in the 
interests of a more genuine freedom would be perceived by people as an assault on their 
freedom of enjoyment.38 Yet, the difficulties in attaining freedom through the spontaneous 
play of instincts reflect a much deeper ambiguity in the very structure of instincts themselves. 
Marcuse speculates, following Freud, that there may be a structural limit internal to the 
instincts themselves which, paradoxically, generates and sustains them:  
But is there perhaps in the instinct itself an inner barrier which “contains” its driving 
power? Is there perhaps a “natural” self-restraint in Eros so that its genuine 
gratification would call for delay, detour, and arrest? Then there would be 
obstructions and limitations imposed not from the outside, by a repressive reality 
35 Ibid., 215. Emphasis in original. 
36 Ibid., 199. 
37 Ibid., 197. Emphasis in original. 
38 Ibid., 224-225. 
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principle, but set and accepted by the instinct itself because they have inherent 
libidinal value.39  
Moreover, Marcuse says that this notion of an internalized self-limit within the drives was 
already present in Freud: “He [Freud] thought that ‘unrestrained sexual liberty from the 
beginning’ results in lack of full satisfaction… Moreover, he considered the ‘strange’ 
possibility that ‘something in the nature of the sexual instinct is unfavorable to the 
achievement of absolute gratification.’”40  
 Here Marcuse stumbles up against a major paradox in the structure of human desire, 
one that creates problems for the conceptual model of repression and freedom which he 
largely subscribes to: this is not simply the problem that we may not actually desire freedom, 
but rather that full freedom might itself act as a barrier to our gratification. In other words, 
what is being suggested here—and what Freud, as Marcuse acknowledges, was already half 
aware of—is that the very condition of the instincts is their own self-limitation; and rather 
than the problem being their external repression, they contain their own internal limit which 
is what, paradoxically, gives them their energy and impels them forward. The implication—
and it has extremely important consequences for any radical application of psychoanalysis—
is that the removal of external constrains and limits, in so far as they can be removed or 
relaxed, will not necessarily bring about either freedom or satisfaction: it may be that a new 
kind of prohibition will simply emerge from the very heart of desire itself. Put simply, if 
instincts need some sort of limit, barrier, law, prohibition to sustain themselves—to resist, 
transgress, rub up against—then we have to at the very least question the narrative being 
proposed here of the instincts shaping and driving the project of human emancipation.  
 I am not suggesting that the three radical thinkers discussed in this section are in any 
sense naïve about this project: as I have tried to show, they all sound a certain note of caution 
39 Ibid., 226. 
40 Ibid. 
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about the prospects of revolution, the possibilities of full freedom, and indeed about whether 
people are actually ready for freedom. Nevertheless, they all tend to work within the logic of 
what Foucault called the “repressive hypothesis”: the model according to which desire 
(modeled on libido) is repressed, prohibited and constrained by external forces and therefore 
demands to be liberated. Indeed, it is Reich specifically that Foucault makes reference to 
here.41 The problem, for Foucault, was that these external forces—power—which supposedly 
repress pre-existing desire, actually work to produce and elicit it, shaping them it such a way 
that we believe it to be repressed; which would mean that the liberation of desire would play 
right into the hands of the institutions and discourses of power which constructed it. 
 However, the problem with the repression/liberation model that Freud and, more 
particularly Lacan, draw attention to is a slightly different one: it is not so much that external 
social forces produce desire, but rather that desire to some extent demands its own 
prohibition—for what would desire be if there were no limit to transgress and if it were 
allowed to fully realize itself? This claim, as we can see, complicates the radical narrative of 
the liberation of desire, and to understand its implications for politics we need to turn to the 
more “skeptical” psychoanalytic theories of Freud himself, and Lacan. 
 
Repression, Super-Ego and the Death Drive: Freud 
For a psychoanalytic analysis of the tension between the individual’s desire for freedom and 
the repressive restrictions of the social order, one is obliged to start with Freud’s essay, 
Civilization and its Discontents (1929), which is as much a work of political theory as it is a 
psychoanalytic investigation of the sources of neurotic guilt. Indeed, as Freud maintains, 
neurotic suffering and guilt are symptomatic of our being ill at ease with our civilization, the 
sacrifices it demands and the restrictions it imposes upon our behavior, particularly our 
41 M. Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Volume One, trans., R. Hurley (London: 
Penguin, 1998), 131. 
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sexual life, which it severely impairs. While our civilization gives us many great things—not 
only security but comforts and conveniences, cultural developments, and so on—the 
phenomenon of human unhappiness indicates that many of us feel that the price we have paid 
for these, the restriction of our instincts, is too high. In a version of social contract theory, 
Freud proposes that our civilization was essentially founded on a trade-off of the unfettered 
freedom of our primitive condition in return for security and the possibility of peaceful co-
existence. However, this required the repression of the individual’s more aggressive and 
sexualized instincts, which were dangerous to civilized co-existence. Moreover, the survival 
of community life depends, according to Freud, on the sublimation of erotic drives into the 
development of relations with others, as well as into cultural achievements. Therefore, the 
principle of individual freedom and that of civilized community are in tension with one 
another. As Freud puts it, “The liberty of the individual is no gift of civilization.”42 
Civilization and community life are based on a progressive taming of the individual and the 
repression and diversion of his instincts and desires.  
 Most fundamentally, civilization must hold in check the death instinct, the aggressive 
drive towards destruction. While Eros, the love instinct, which is directed towards union with 
others, may be sublimated into community life, Thanatos, the death instinct, is fundamentally 
hostile to civilization and destructive of all social bonds, and must therefore be restrained. 
Freud’s well-known argument here is that the individuals’ encounter with external laws and 
prohibitions, first through the patriarchal authority of the family, and then through an 
interaction with social institutions, induces him to internalise his aggressive instincts, to turn 
them back upon himself and towards his own ego, so that he is more likely to chafe against 
himself rather than against those around him. Thus we have the invention of guilt, the “bad 
conscience” upon which civilization is built. This death drive, turned back onto the 
42 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 42. 
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individual, takes the form of the super-ego, the voice of moral conscience, in which, as Freud 
observes, there is a strong element of aggression, and which constitutes an internalized 
agency of self-policing and moral censorship: 
The tension between the harsh super-ego and the ego that is subjected to it, is called 
by us the sense of guilt; it expresses itself as a need for punishment. Civilization, 
therefore, obtains mastery over the individual's dangerous desire for aggression by 
weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, 
like a garrison in a conquered city.43  
The individual appears as always guilty before the all-seeing panoptic eye of the Super-ego, 
which castigates him as much as much for what he hasn’t done as for what he has done, 
punishing the saint more than the sinner. Transgressive thoughts are as morally blameworthy 
as transgressive deeds in the eyes of the super-ego, and, as Freud observes, the guilty, 
neurotic individual within civilization, so far from seeking freedom, often demands 
punishment.  
 So, as Freud would have it, the history of our civilization is the history of our 
repression – a repression which operates externally in the form of legal and social-moral 
norms prohibitions, and, more importantly, internally, in the form of moral consciousness and 
Super-egoic guilt. While repression and guilt are often excessive—and indeed it was the role 
of psychoanalysis to help the individual alleviate the neurotic guilt that was literally making 
him sick—they are at the same time inevitable. Some degree of constraint, repression, 
inhibition is necessary for there to be any possibility of peaceful coexistence and community 
life, and guilt is the inevitable price we pay for this possibility. Our progressive taming and 
disciplining, firstly of the Oedipal child within the family, and later of the individual within 
broader society, is a necessary developmental process. There is a certain tension here, then, 
43 Ibid., 70-71. 
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between Freud’s cry of protest against the severity of moral constraints and the demands of 
the Superego discussed earlier, and his acceptance of the need for limits and constraints in 
order to hold civilization together. 
 As we have seen, the reason why repression is necessary is because of the aggressive 
and dangerously anti-social drives within us, which threaten to rend civilization apart. Here 
Freud expresses a fundamental pessimism about human nature, reminiscent of Hobbes:  
The element of truth behind this, which people are so ready to disavow, is that men 
are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend 
themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose 
instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a 
result, their neighbor is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also 
someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his 
capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to 
seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him. 
Homo homini lupus.44  
There is a clear disagreement here with anarchism which, while not in any sense naïve about 
the human condition, nevertheless supposes a more or less natural instinct towards 
sociability, cooperation, and mutual aid. For Freud, on the contrary, the fundamentally anti-
social individual must be disciplined into sociability and altruism; it does not come naturally 
or easily to him, and is arrived at only with great effort and sacrifice, and a large measure of 
suffering.45 This is why Freud, while not entirely unsympathetic to the goals of revolutionary 
movements, was at the same time skeptical about their success.46  
44 Ibid., 58. Emphasis in original. 
45 Freud, for instance, mentions how unnatural it is to be expected to “love thy neighbour”—and yet this is what 
our civilization commands us to do (ibid., 56-59). 
46 Freud makes reference to the Bolshevik revolution and the aspiration to a communist society in Russia, 
which, he believes derives its energy from a relation of enmity and would only result in further aggression and 
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 There seems at this juncture little to redeem Freud from an anarchist point of view. 
However, what if we were to suggest that the two interrelated aspirations of anarchism— 
individual autonomy and harmonious communal coexistence—actually presuppose a certain 
disciplining of the instincts? By this I mean not only that if an individual is to live with others 
in a community, there must be some curbs on his behavior, something which anarchists 
certainly acknowledge. In an anarchist community there would indeed be rules and ethical 
limits, which are democratically decided (“rules without rulers”); indeed, rules, limitations 
and boundaries are inherent in the very notion of community, which requires some form of 
obligation placed upon the individual, or which the individual voluntary places himself 
under.47 However, I also mean that the very possibility of freedom and autonomy requires a 
certain (self-) discipline.  
 As I have suggested earlier in the chapter, it is by no means clear that our instincts 
naturally tend towards greater freedom; on the contrary, they often tend in pathological 
directions towards psychic attachments to authority. Such tendencies point to the dangers 
posed to the self and one’s own freedom by one’s wayward and undisciplined desires. Thus 
we arrive at the old problem of positive freedom, and the need for a certain discipline in order 
to be free—something that was recognised by Rousseau and Kant, and also in a different 
sense by Foucault in his discussion of “ascesis” as an ethics of self-mastery.48 After all, 
autonomy means “self-government,” which implies the ability to master one’s own desires 
and instincts: to be master of one’s self. As Richard Flathman argues, within oneself there are 
tendencies, desires, and dependencies that make one more susceptible to the power of others, 
violence once property relations are abolished: “One only wonders, with concern, what the Soviets will do after 
they have wiped out their bourgeois” (ibid., 62). 
47 See, for instance, M. Taylor, Community, Anarchy and Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982). 
48 M. Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: Interview with Michel 
Foucault,” Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume One, ed. P. Rabinow, trans. R. Hurley, et al. 
(London: Penguin, 2000), 281-302. 
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and therefore without discipline there is no agency and therefore no possibility of freedom.49 
From a Freudian perspective, it could be argued that one only has a hope of becoming an 
autonomous adult by first going through a process of Oedipal disciplining, by which the child 
encounters, and therefore has a chance of resisting, the Oedipal position of the Father; and it 
is only through this encounter with the position of symbolic authority that the child’s instincts 
can be partially mastered, and that the child, in rebelling against this authority, can gain a 
greater sense of himself.  
 So, what I am proposing here—and I think this is present in Freudian theory—is that 
autonomy is only possible through an agonistic relationship with some form of authority or 
limit, and this of course necessitates the existence of such a limit. Moreover, we could say, 
again following Freud, that projects of political emancipation depend upon a certain 
collective discipline, as well as being “cultural” artifices, and as such, are only possible 
within civilization, and emerge from within the constraints which civilization imposes. The 
very fact that movements of political and social emancipation, including anarchism itself, are 
founded on ethical norms and political ideas which have only emerged as a result of the 
cultural achievements of civilization and the disciplining it entails, points to this.50 
 
Desire, Law, and Limit: Jacques Lacan 
In developing this idea of an interdependent relationship between freedom and limit, we now 
turn to the thought of Jacques Lacan, who was best known for reading Freudian theory 
through the framework of structuralist linguistics, mostly via Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, and 
Jakobson. Lacan’s famous formulation—that the unconscious is “structured like a 
49 See R. Flathman, Freedom and its Conditions: Discipline, Autonomy, and Resistance (New York: Routledge, 
2003). 
50 I have the utmost respect for the “anti-civilizational” or “primitivist” tendency in anarchism—especially the 
thought of John Zerzan. However, Zerzan’s radical critique of our technological civilization is still beholden to 
civilization and the cultural and intellectual developments which made such critiques possible. 
27 
 
                                                          
language”51—points once again to the social dimension—in Lacan’s case the external order 
of language and signification—within which the unconscious is situated and which 
psychoanalysis takes as its proper field of investigation.  
 Freud’s concern with the conflicting relationship between the individual and broader 
society is taken up by Lacan in his psychoanalytic approach to ethics. It is here that we must 
reconsider the relationship between desire and law, particularly moral law. As I have 
suggested, the “repressive hypothesis” central to the radical articulations of psychoanalytic 
theory discussed previously, works on the assumption that the Law—by which we can 
understand legal and social constraints and moral prohibitions of all kinds—restricts and 
represses desire. However, Lacan’s insight is to show that the relationship between desire and 
Law is much more ambiguous and complex: rather than law simply acting as a limit upon 
desire, it actually stimulates and incites it, and it does this by holding out the promise of an 
impossible enjoyment—jouissance—on the other side of the law. In the creating a barrier 
between the subject and his enjoyment, the Law sustains the illusion of an ultimate 
satisfaction (the lost object of enjoyment, the Thing) awaiting him on the other side of this 
limit. So, in saying ‘”no” to desire, the Law actually invites its own transgression. In other 
words, the Law of prohibition acts as a veil which shrouds the emptiness and impossibility of 
full enjoyment, which is essentially equivalent to death, thus eliciting desire. The Thing, the 
ultimate object of our desires, only exists insofar as there is a law to prohibit it. As Lacan 
says, in relation to biblical commandments: “Yet I can only know the Thing by means of the 
Law. In effect, I would not have had the idea to covet it if the Law hadn’t said: ‘Thou shalt 
51 J. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, ed. J.-
A. Miller and trans. A. Sheridan (London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1998), 20. Emphasis in original. 
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not covet it.’”52 So, we might propose a dialectical relationship between desire and law 
which, as Lacan says, “causes our desire to flare up only in relation to Law.”53  
 To illustrate this paradoxical relationship between desire and Law, Lacan gives the 
example of courtly love in the Middle Ages, which was a series of rituals and discourses— 
indeed, an entire system of ethics and codes of behavior—involved in the courtship of the 
Lady. However, so far from this being a romantic enterprise, Lacan shows that this was 
actually an elaborately coded set of behaviors designed to put off—to infinitely postpone 
through ever more exacting hurdles and capricious demands—any real sexual encounter with 
the Lady, whose desire must remain enigmatic and inaccessible.54 The sexual encounter was 
thus sublimated by the male subject into a series of barriers placed in the way of love’s 
consummation, precisely in order that desire could be sustained. This curious ritual of courtly 
love might be seen as a paradigm of male desire—and indeed of the rather fraught 
relationship between men and women—in which the trauma of the real encounter with the 
Other is continually avoided, so that, as Lacan would put it, the emptiness and structural 
impossibility of the sexual relationship (“Il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel”) can remain masked. 
More generally, is there not something in the nature of human desire which demands 
precisely to not be satisfied, and whereby the encounter with the imagined object of desire is 
one of anxiety, or the degradation and diminishment of what was once desired? The 
fulfillment of desire is at the same time its eclipse; that which must be avoided at any cost so 
that we can go on desiring. 
 What are the political implications of this? It would appear to strike at the very heart 
of political desire, forcing us perhaps to question what we imagine to be the ultimate aim of 
our political projects, and the fantasies invested in the idea of attainment of full freedom or 
52 J. Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, ed. J.-A. Miller, 
trans. D. Porter (London: Routledge, 1992), 83. 
53 Ibid., 83-84. 
54 Ibid., 145-154. 
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the liberated society awaiting us on the other side of power and law. I am not suggesting that 
these aspirations and visions are not important to radical political mobilization; but we also 
need to recognize their necessarily fantasmatic role in the structuring of political desire. More 
importantly, however, what if it were the case that the revolutionary drive actually needed 
law and prohibition—the repressive structure of political and social authority—in order to 
sustain itself and to have something to oppose and transgress? And what if this were so 
precisely to preserve the illusion that full freedom (the satisfaction of revolutionary desire) 
was attainable if only this structure of authority were removed?  
 As a hypothesis, what I am suggesting here is not simply that symbolic authority—the 
prohibitive figure of the Master, or in political terms, the State—is necessary in order to 
sustain revolutionary desire, but that it might even serve as a sort of cover or excuse 
justifying a certain revolutionary pathos. In other words, might it not be the case that a certain 
figure of absolute and repressive political authority allows us to say, effectively: we would be 
truly free if it were not for the State that stands in our way? Is there not a sense in which 
anarchists fantasize about the all-powerful State that denies their freedom, in the same way 
that they fantasize about the freedom that awaits them once the state is destroyed? We have at 
least to consider the possibility that the revolutionary narrative actually needs the State to 
sustain its desire, and, indeed, that this might even prevent us from living freely in the here 
and now. 
 Furthermore, given this dialectical relationship between the desire for freedom and the 
law of prohibition identified by Lacan, what actually happens when the law breaks down and 
when the restrictions and barriers to our freedom are removed? Does that mean that we are 
now free? Alas, things are not quite so simple. Because, according to Lacan, an encounter 
with the object of desire would be traumatic and anxiety-provoking, and because, as Freud 
himself noticed, desire needs its own limit, the removal of the Law of prohibition does not 
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mean that we are finally free, but rather that a new form of internalized prohibition comes to 
fore in its place, rendering us even more unfree. Like the obsessive who fantasizes about the 
death of his father, whom he imagines acts as a barrier to his freedom, and yet who, when his 
father finally does die, cannot enjoy his freedom and is instead wracked by guilt, the collapse 
of one form of social and symbolic authority actually intensifies prohibition and incapacity. 
In reversing the line from Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov (“God is dead; now 
everything is permitted”), Lacan says: “God is dead, nothing is permitted anymore.”55 In 
other words, the removal from the modern consciousness of this ultimate patriarchal Father, 
this symbol of traditional authority and prohibition, so far from liberating us, is the final 
confirmation of our repression.  
 That is why there is, according to Lacan, a structural correspondence between the 
moral law of Kant and the perverse universe of Sade. The perversity of the Kantian 
attachment to the moral law—beyond any pathological considerations or interests—finds its 
logical counterpart and echo in the strange morality of Sadeian universal law of perversion, 
whose morbid injunction to the unadulterated use and enjoyment of bodies, the absolute right 
to jouissance, becomes something like a categorical imperative.56 So, the point here is that 
the breakdown of traditional forms of moral and social authority does not inaugurate the reign 
of freedom, but rather instantiates a new regime of prohibition—and here we should pay 
attention to Lacan’s remark about the failure of the libertarian project: “The naturalist 
liberation of desire has failed historically. We do not find ourselves in the presence of a man 
less weighed down with laws and duties than before the great critical experience of so-called 
libertine thought.”57  
55 J. Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII, trans. R. Grigg (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006), 106.  
56 J. Lacan, “Kant with Sade,” in Ecrits, trans. B. Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006), 645-667. 
57 Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 4. 
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 Many of the experiments of sexual liberation in the 1960s and 70s proved failures, 
with free sex communes ending up as rather boring and sad spaces of routinized sex, subject 
to their own injunctions and rules, driven by a kind of desperate and morbid desire for a 
jouissance which at the same time runs up against its own internal barrier.58 So the removal 
of one limit engenders another, as there is no greater threat to desire than the absence of 
limits. Today’s era of sexual permissiveness—at least in most liberal-democratic societies— 
seems to me to be permeated by a kind of sadness and loss of enjoyment, as we appear to 
have reached a point of saturation and boredom in matters of sex; the ever more transgressive 
and extreme forms of pornography on offer today are same time indicative of a kind of 
despair at a sexual revolution that has now run out of ideas. 
 More broadly, in contemporary societies, in which traditional, patriarchal authority no 
longer functions, in which law is no longer taken seriously and political leaders are figures of 
popular ridicule—a transformation which Lacan characterized long ago by the “decline of the 
paternal function”—can we not see the emergence of new forms of control which are all the 
more terrifying for their “formlessness” and lack of hierarchy? In today’s neoliberal societies, 
in which voluntary obedience to the dictates of the market and consumer culture replaces 
traditional authoritarianism, control takes the very form of individual freedom and 
enjoyment. As Žižek, following Lacan’s insight, remarks, there is now a Superegoic 
injunction to Enjoy! which is much more compelling than the strictest of moral 
prohibitions.59 Furthermore, the proliferation today, in these supposedly freer and more 
permissive times, of rules governing the minutiae of everyday behavior—everything from 
58 David Bennett discusses the history of sexual revolutions, and in particular of the Friedrichshof sex commune 
in Austria, whose initial celebration of free and spontaneous sexuality quickly deteriorated into a routinized and 
ordered regime of sex, complete with computer-generated “fuck lists.” See “Sexual Revolutions: Towards a 
Brief History, From the Fall of Man to the Present,” in Heuer, Sexual Revolution, 35-51. 
59S. Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out (London: Routledge, 2008). See also T. 
McGowan, The End of Dissatisfaction?: Jacques Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2004). 
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restrictions on smoking in public places, to rules on sexual harassment in the workplace, to 
the PC policing of language itself, and to the prevalence of “ethics committees” in all kinds 
of institutions—points to the new kind of obsessiveness which has come to take the place of 
traditional forms of authority.  
 That our liberal societies, with their formal rights and freedoms, are, on an everyday 
level, highly illiberal and have come to resemble many of the traits of the fundamentalist 
societies they like to proclaim their distance from, should come as no surprise. Moreover, the 
decline of the traditional figure of the Father, as the symbol of prohibition and law, does not, 
once again, mean the end of authority, but simply a different kind of authority. Instead, we 
see the proliferation of what might be called “perverse fathers”: no longer, in Zizek’s 
example, the father who says “no” to his son’s enjoyment—thus allowing a space for 
transgression when his back is turned—but who rather, with a glint in his eye, says “yes,”—
thus effectively making any kind of transgression, and therefore any kind of enjoyment, 
impossible.60 We see this figure in politicians too—perhaps most paradigmatically, in recent 
times, in Silvio Berlusconi, who, far from being the austere leader aspiring to moral authority, 
more or less openly embodied his own corruption, debauchery, and farcicality. Political 
authority today, it would seem, invites its own transgression, even its own ridicule, with 
politicians routinely lampooning themselves on idiotic “reality TV” shows.  
 
What You Want Is Another Master! 
We can see here, then, how problematic and ambiguous the notion of liberation from 
repression has become, at a time when control takes the form of freedom, and when liberal 
permissiveness and the relaxation of sexual constraints produces guilt and anxiety, and ends 
60 As Jana Costas and Alireza Taheri have argued, the collapse of traditional symbolic authority in our societies 
has led to the uncanny return of the persecutory fantasy of the Primal Father—the ultimate figure of 
unconstrained jouissance—which becomes omnipresent and produces guilt and anxiety everywhere. See “‘The 
Return of the Primal Father’ in Postmodernity? A Lacanian Analysis of Authentic Leadership,” Organization 
Studies, 33:9 (2012), 1195-1216. 
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up in the demand for new restrictions and limits. No doubt Lacan foresaw this when he 
responded to his rebellious students during the May ‘68 uprising with these enigmatic words: 
“Revolutionary aspirations have only one possibility: always to end up in the discourse of the 
master. Experience has proven this. What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a master. You 
will have one!”61 However, while this might appear to damn revolutionary endeavors from 
the very start and align Lacan with a conservative and apolitical position, I propose an 
alternative reading: is there not a warning here, addressed to revolutionaries, that unless they 
come to terms with their own hidden desire for mastery, they risk replicating one form of 
authority and power for another; and was this not precisely the same warning that the 
anarchists addressed to Marxists? These words might therefore be taken as an admonition to 
confront and interrogate the vagaries of one’s own revolutionary desire, the fascination with 
power and the aggressive and authoritarian impulses that lie in all of our breasts—something 
that was recognized, in different ways, by both Bakunin and Freud, as well as Gross and 
Reich.  
 In his Seminar XVII (presented 1969-70, largely in response to May ‘68), Lacan 
introduced the theory of the four discourses that constitute the social link. By “discourse,” 
Lacan means a formal structural position constituted by fundamental relations of language, 
but which is beyond actual words and utterances: a “discourse without speech.”62 These four 
discourses are that of the University, Master, Hysteric, and Analyst. These discourses are 
important to the question of radical politics because they are a way of explaining social 
changes and upheavals. Moreover, these discourses show that the link between transgression 
and authority is constituted by a structural, and indeed inevitable, relation between discursive 
positions.  
61 Cited in Y. Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political (London: Routledge, 1999), 12. 
62 Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 12. Emphasis in orginal. 
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 The discourse of the Master embodies self-mastery and sovereignty—the attempt to 
constitute an autonomous ego, one whose identity is secure in complete self-knowledge. This 
discourse is characterized by the dominance of the Master Signifier (S1), through which the 
subject sustains the illusion of self-identity. The discourse of the Master stands in a particular 
relation of authority to knowledge, seeking to dominate it, and exclude from consciousness 
the knowledge of the unconscious—the knowledge that is not known—as this would 
jeopardize the ego’s sense of certainty.63 The Master’s attempt to gain authority over 
knowledge instantiates a position of political sovereignty and an attempt to gain mastery over 
the social field.64 As Lacan shows, moreover, political movements and discourses which seek 
to transform society, to overthrow the dominant discourse of the Master, are still trapped 
within this discourse and ultimately perpetuate it, ending up in the same place of power and 
authority. The discourse of the Master thus encompasses even those revolutionary theories 
which seek to overthrow it: 
What I mean by this is that it embraces everything, even what thinks of itself as 
revolutionary, or more exactly what is romantically called Revolution with a capital 
R. The discourse of the master accomplishes its own revolution in the other sense of 
doing a complete circle.65  
Central here is the relationship between the Master and the Hysteric. Because of the 
dominance of the S1 in the Master discourse, an excess of enjoyment is produced—the a or 
plus-de-jour—for which there is no place in this discourse, and which is therefore excluded 
and projected onto the slave, as in Hegel’s Master/Slave dialectic. Therefore the knowledge 
of the object-cause of the Master’s own desire is denied to him. What this means, however, is 
that the position of the Master is really the position of castration, as he is cut off from his 
63 Moreover, it is the role of the University Discourse to provide the justification through knowledge, of the 
discursive “truth” of the Master’s position. 
64 Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 31. 
65 Ibid., 99. 
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object a, from enjoyment. What the Master discourse conceals, then, behind its posture of 
certainty and fullness of identity, is a fundamental lack. It is precisely this lack that the 
discourse of the Hysteric, in a paradoxical fashion, homes in on.  
 The position of the Hysteric is characterized by an identification with an unsatisfied 
desire. Because the agent here realizes her lack—the lack of the object of desire that will 
complete her identity—her position is characterized by a demand to know who she is and 
what her desire is.66 This demand is always addressed to the other, and it is because of the 
nature of this demand that the Hysteric makes a Master out of the other. In other words, the 
Hysteric’s demand is addressed to the Master, who is expected to provide an answer to her 
desire. However, due to the impossibility of satisfying this desire, the answer that the Master 
provides is always wrong or inadequate. In order to keep his desire alive, the Hysteric 
therefore has a vested interest in sustaining the lack in the Master. The Hysteric is thus 
always testing the knowledge and authority of the Master who, in trying to conceal his lack 
and shore up his position of authority, provides answers that only reveal his impotence and 
lack all the more. The Hysteric thus exposes the imposture of sovereign authority. The 
Hysteric increasingly comes to see the Master as an impediment to the realization of her 
desire; however, at the same time, she has to sustain the position of the Master in order to 
sustain her desire, for once desire is satisfied, it collapses. Do we not have here the very 
pathos of revolutionary politics?  
 While things might appear to be an impasse, Lacan proposes a way of breaking out of 
this bind between transgression and authority. Here another discourse must intervene—that of 
the Analyst—which, according to Lacan, offers the only genuine counterpoint to and 
subversion of the position of the Master. The role of analysis, in Lacanian terms, is to allow 
the subject to own his or her alienation and desire, by confronting him with his own 
66 See P. Verhaeghe, “From Impossibility to Inability: Lacan’s Theory on the Four Discourses,” The Letter:  
Lacanian Perspectives on Psychoanalysis 3 (Spring 1995), 91-108. 
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unconscious fantasy—producing a gap between the subject and ego idea—and to accept that 
the Other, which supports this fantasy structure, is itself deficient, lacking, and ungrounded. 
This would be what Lacan calls la traversée du fantasme—crossing or traversing the fantasy. 
In other words, the intervention of the Analyst offers the subject the possibility of achieving 
greater autonomy: while master signifiers continue to exist for the subject, they are 
ungrounded and lack ultimate authority, and the contingency of the social field and the 
subject’s place within it becomes fully visible. In other words, while the subject cannot 
entirely escape the Master’s discourse—escape into what, apart from another Master’s 
discourse?—he or she is able to gain a greater distance and autonomy from it, and is able to 
bring about change.67  
 Let us try to understand this process in political terms. Going through the Analyst’s 
position might involve, on the one hand, a questioning of the fundamental fantasy that has 
sustained revolutionary projects in the past—the idea of total liberation and social 
transformation, and the image of the harmonious and free society “on the other side” of 
power and authority. Here I would invoke Foucault’s warning that revolutionary liberation 
does not necessarily solve the problem of power, and that what is more important are the 
“practices of freedom” in the present, whereby one engages agonistically with the specific 
power relations.68 Furthermore, we can also think about the way in which the Analyst’s 
discourse fosters a greater autonomy within the political subject by revealing the imposture 
and impotence of political authority, unmasking the essential powerless of power. We have 
seen the way in which the fantasy of the all-powerful State serves as both a provocation and 
an impediment to revolutionary action. The anarchist’s desire to destroy the State is caught 
within a strange dialectic in which the State is both needed as an incitement to revolution, as 
well as serving as a kind of cover or excuse for an internal deadlock. Perhaps it would be 
67 Costas and Taheri, “‘The Return of the Primal Father,’” 1201. 
68 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom.” 
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more effective to say that the Master (or the State) exists but that it has no real authority; that 
it is nothing more than an empty symbolic shell whose existence is entirely contingent and 
ungrounded, and whose only power is the power that we give it.  
 The Analyst’s position teaches us that all symbolic authority is ultimately a fake, and 
that while it might continue to exist in some abstract sense, it has no real determination over 
our lives. Perhaps, in other words, the Analyst’s discourse allows us to realize that while 
Power exists it has no real power over us, and that we are always already free. It seems we 
have returned to La Boetie’s astonishing insight: people, living under tyranny, had the power 
all along and the Tyrant’s power was essentially an illusion; freedom was therefore simply a 
matter of recognizing this and willing to be free. La Boetie’s problematic of voluntary 
servitude—which has as its radical flipside voluntary inservitude—might be seen as an 
example of the Analyst’s intervention. So, too, might Stirner’s idea of insurrection, as 
opposed to revolution:  
Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The former 
consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established condition or status, the 
state or society, and is accordingly a political or social act; the latter has indeed for its 
unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it 
but from men’s discontent with themselves, is not an armed rising but a rising of 
individuals, a getting up without regard to the arrangements that spring from it. The 
Revolution aimed at new arrangements; insurrection leads us no longer to let 
ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on 
“institutions.” It is not a fight against the established, since, if it prospers, the 
established collapses of itself; it is only a working forth of me out of the established.69 
(Stirner 1995: 279-80 [emphasis in original]) 
69 Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, 279-280. Emphasis in original. 
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Unlike the revolution, which springs from the Hysteric’s condition of powerlessness—which 
is why it seeks to insert itself within the position of the Master—the insurrection signifies an 
indifference to power, and it starts from the condition of ontological freedom. So it is not a 
question of seeking to transform social relations, although this might be one of its outcomes, 
but rather of the subject distancing himself from power, turning his back upon it, whereupon 
power collapses. Stirner, the Analyst of the anarchist tradition, shows us not how we might 
become free on the back of a revolution—which would only re-establish authority—but how 
we are already free, and how we might come to recognize this, beyond the “spooks” and 
apparitions of power. 
 
Conclusion 
The ontological freedom and autonomy made possible by the realization of the radically 
contingent nature of social reality and the ungroundedness of authority, does not render 
political action unnecessary or superfluous. On the contrary, it frees political action from, on 
the one hand, utopian promises, and on the other, from disabling fantasies about omnipotent 
power and insurmountable authority. It allows political desire to traverse its own fundamental 
fantasy. While it is certainly the case that anarchism’s encounter with psychoanalysis 
complicates the narrative of revolution and liberation—revealing its paradoxical dependence 
on law and limit—it also allows not only a deeper understanding of the political psyche, but 
also provides important ethical tools with which to interrogate the subject’s desire. The 
opening up of the social-symbolic space might be seen as a common goal of these two 
traditions of thought which are, in different ways, both committed to human freedom and 
autonomy. 
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